terrypsv@goeland:~/en/lab$
LAB

Architecture

production, lab, roadmap

Two separate setups. On one side, the server that hosts this site. On the other, a private lab split into sealed zones, where I practice attack and defense safely.

4isolated network zones
30daily checks
A+SSL Labs, Headers, Observatory
22projects in progress
Architecture diagram On the left, production. Internet traffic reaches a dedicated server, goes through a proxy that encrypts it, then reaches the site, which is monitored daily. On the right, the lab, with administrator access through an encrypted tunnel to the firewall, which separates three isolated zones. At the bottom, the roadmap. PRODUCTION Internet visitors Dedicated server firewall and restricted access Traffic encryption certificate renewed automatically The site, not exposed INFRASTRUCTURE LAB Administrator access encrypted tunnel Firewall and detection routing and filtering between zones DMZ vulnerable test targets LAN directory accounts and access RED testing attack machine no communication between zones Automated monitoring about thirty points compared every day ROADMAP - HOMELAB Hypervisor salvaged machine Proxmox VE personal lab Storage custom-built NAS backups archiving Firewall OPNsense VLAN segmentation home network

Production

  1. Internetvisitors
  2. Dedicated serverfirewall and restricted access
  3. Traffic encryptioncertificate renewed automatically
  4. The sitenever reached directly

Lab

  1. Administrator accessencrypted tunnel
  2. Firewall and detectionseparates and watches the zones
DMZtest targets
LANdirectory and accounts
REDattack machine

no communication between zones

Monitoring

  1. Daily checkabout thirty points compared every day
01

Production

in service

This site runs on a server reserved for it, with no link to the lab. Each part has a single role.

System base

Linux server hosted in France. Restricted administrator access, automatic security updates.

debian 13systemdkey-based SSHauto updates

Filtering

A firewall denies everything by default and only opens what is strictly needed. Repeated login attempts are blocked automatically.

nftablesfail2bandefault deny

TLS termination

Traffic is encrypted end to end, with a certificate renewed automatically. The browser receives strict rules on what it is allowed to load.

caddyACMELet's EncryptHSTSCSP

Deployment

A single command updates the site, from the repository to production. Every version is rebuilt identically, with no manual step.

gitesbuildsystemdreproducible build

Dependencies

The libraries used by the site are watched automatically. When a flaw is published, the fix is proposed the same day.

dependabotnpm auditautomatic fixes

Application

The site never receives requests from the Internet directly, they all go through the proxy. It runs with minimal rights and capped memory.

nodefastifytypescripthardened systemd
02

Infrastructure lab

in service

A second-hand server brought back into service, with limited memory. That constraint shaped the whole architecture, and it is what makes the exercise interesting.

Hypervisor

A single physical machine runs about ten isolated systems. A backup is taken before every significant change.

Proxmox VELXCKVMZFS

Routing and segmentation

A firewall splits the network into four zones that do not talk to each other. None of them can be reached from the Internet.

OPNsenseVLANDMZNAT

Detection

A detection system watches the traffic. I attack from one zone and check that the alert really fires in the other.

SuricataIDSlogsrules

Directory

A rebuilt company directory, like the ones found in most organizations. It is used to understand how these environments are attacked and defended.

Samba AD DCKerberosLDAP

Offensive zone

A machine dedicated to penetration testing, facing deliberately vulnerable applications. It can reach neither the rest of the lab nor the Internet.

Kali LinuxOWASP Top 10training targets

Remote access

Administration goes through an encrypted tunnel, with a different key for each device.

WireGuardkey per deviceshared secret
03

Monitoring

in service

The lab watches the site from the outside. A daily check compares its state with the day before and reports the slightest difference.

01

Transport

Does the site answer, is the connection properly encrypted, is the certificate still valid.

02

Web surface

Are the protections sent to the browser still in place, and has the page content changed for no reason.

03

Domain name

Does the domain name still point to the right place, and has nobody else obtained a certificate in my name.

04

Roadmap

coming

The next step is to rebuild this architecture at home, on my own network. The hardware is being gathered.

01Personal hypervisor planned

A salvaged machine, brought back into service to host a second lab, independent from the first.

ProxmoxWazuhSIEM

02Storage and backups planned

A custom-built storage server, to keep backups somewhere other than the machine they protect.

NASZFS3-2-1 rule

03Home firewall planned

A firewall at the edge of the home network, to keep personal use apart from the lab.

OPNsenseVLANsegmentation
05

Heading

goals

What follows is not a roadmap, it is a direction. I want to design everything I build, from the circuit board to the software that drives it, all the way to the finished object. Then connect these fields in a single infrastructure, with shared tooling able to cover them all, and that stands on its own without owing anything to anyone.

Some of these subjects are out of reach today. They will stay that way for less time if I prepare for them now.

01

Trusted hardware

Devices that prove what they run, instead of asking to be believed.

All security today rests on trust granted to the manufacturer. I want to reverse that. Design hardware that can show the person using it which code it really runs. Doing it in software is already hard. Doing it in silicon is the next step.

02

Medical devices

Protecting devices whose failure cannot be undone.

A monitor, a pump, an implant. These machines keep people alive and are sometimes controlled without serious authentication. Regulation is moving, tooling is not. Everything is still to be built, and almost nobody is working on it.

03

Defense and sovereignty

Equipment where every component is under control, from the circuit to the code.

A weapon system that cannot be fully audited remains a disguised dependency. Designing, building and verifying on one's own territory is not a stance, it is the only way to know what the things you deploy really do.

04

Industrial and embedded

Securing the machines that keep a country running.

Water treatment, energy, production lines. Thirty-year-old controllers that can be neither stopped nor replaced, now connected to networks they were never designed to face. Protecting them without touching them is a beautiful problem.

05

Autonomous systems

Machines that move and decide on their own, and can therefore be hijacked.

Drones, robots, vehicles. An intrusion there no longer steals data, it takes control of an object that acts in the real world. Knowing how to design them and knowing how to defeat them are two sides of the same craft, and I want both.

06

Spectrum control

Seeing, understanding and contesting what travels over the air.

Radar, telemetry, command links. Anything that transmits can be detected, analyzed and disrupted. This invisible battle takes as much electronics as signal processing, and it is one of the most demanding fields of the discipline.

07

Measurement instruments

Building the missing devices needed to observe hardware.

Auditing a board means reading its signals, its power draw and its memory while it runs. The instruments that do this cost tens of thousands of euros, when they exist at all. Building them yourself opens doors that nobody else opens.

08

Artificial intelligence

Attacking and defending systems that learn.

A model embedded in a machine becomes a new kind of attack surface. It can be fooled, extracted, poisoned. In return, it spots weak signals that no hand-written rule would catch. Both directions interest me equally.

confidential what comes before is only a part

All of it with my own hands.